ABSTRACT This paper considers the risk of incurring future medical expenditures in light of a family's resources available to pay for those expenditures as well as their choice of health insurance. We model non-premium medical out-of-pocket expenditures and use the estimates from our model to develop a prospective measure of medical care economic risk estimating the proportion of families who are at risk of incurring high non-premium out-of-pocket medical care expenses in relation to its resources. We further use the estimates from our model to compare the extent to which different types of insurance mitigate the risk of incurring non-premium expenditures by providing for increased utilization of medical care. We find that while 21.3% of families lack the resources to pay for the median expenditures for their insurance type, 42.4% lack the resources to pay for the 99 th percentile of expenditures for their insurance type. We also find the mediating effect of insurance on non-premium expenditures to outweigh the associated premium expense for expenditures above $1804 for employer-sponsored insurance and $4337 for direct purchase insurance for those younger than age 65; and above $12 118 of expenditures for Medicare supplementary plans for those aged 65 or older. Published 2016. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.
INTRODUCTION
For many families, facing an unexpected adverse health event and incurring large medical expenditures could cause significant financial distress (Babiarz et al., 2013) . While certain systematic health-related risk can be attributed to a person's characteristics, such as age and health status, all individuals bear some unpredictable risk of experiencing such an event. Individuals can purchase health insurance to mitigate this risk, and indeed, evidence finds insurance effective in lessening medical-related financial distress (Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011; Mazumder and Miller, 2014) . In addition to insurance, individuals more specifically consider future medical care needs by using flexible spending accounts to mediate future medical expenses (Hamilton and Marton, 2008; Peter et al., 2015; Cardon and Showalter, 2001; Cardon and Showalter, 2007) . However, a person's ability to insure against future medical needs is subject to available resources, and as a result, many individuals remain sub-optimally insured and financially vulnerable.
It is important to be able to quantify the risk of financial distress associated with future medical care across the population and consider the role of insurance in mediating this risk. However, estimating a prospective measure of medical care economic risk is not straightforward. First, amounts of medical expenditures are not normally distributed: in a given year most individuals have modest expenditures, but a small number of individuals having large, or catastrophic expenditures. Further, estimating a measure of medical care economic risk is limited by the availability, sample size, and timeliness of data on medical expenses as well as individual-and family-level characteristics.
There is a recognized dearth of existing measures quantifying this risk of financial distress associated with medical care. In 1995, the Panel on Poverty and Family Assistance: Concepts, Information Needs, and Measurement Methods recommended that appropriate government agencies develop medical care risk measures reflecting the extent to which families lack or have inadequate health insurance that puts them at risk of not being able to afford needed treatment (National Reasearch Council, 1995) . In 2012, the Panel on Measuring Medical Care Risk in Conjunction with the New Supplemental Income Poverty Measure affirmed that recommendation, calling for the calculation of both a retrospective measure of the burden associated with paying for past medical expenses and a prospective measure of the economic risk associated with future medical care to complement the Supplemental Poverty Measure (National Reasearch Council, 2012) .
A number of papers consider the effects of medical expenditures on families' financial wellbeing, but do not provide an approach for developing a population-wide measure of medical care economic risk that assesses the potential for incurring future expenditures in light of available resources. Several papers consider a retrospective measure of financial burden comparing actual medical out-of-pocket expenditures with resources available for medical care in a prior period (Abramowitz and O'Hara, 2015; Caswell et al., 2013; Short and Banthin, 1995; Banthin and Bernard, 2006; Banthin et al., 2008; Schoen et al., 2011; Cunningham, 2012; among others) . Other work considers topics related to risk and medical expenditures, but does not specifically develop a measure of medical care economic risk across the population. For example, Shen (2013) models the effect of insurance on medical expenditures, and Abraham et al., (2013) assess the degree of financial exposure associated with medical care spending by comparing out-of-pocket non-premium medical expenditures to total medical non-premium expenditures. In addition, several papers examine the reduction in the risk of large expenditures associated with specific programs, including Medicare (Barcellos and Jacobson, 2014) , Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage (Engelhardt and Gruber, 2011) , and the 2008 Oregon Medicaid expansion (Finkelstein et al., 2012; Baicker et al., 2013) . Gruber and Levy (2009) do use a non-parametric cell-based approach to estimate prospective measures of medical care economic risk. They construct cells based on age, education, and household size characteristics and examine risk as measures of the dispersion of spending on medical care and insurance premiums considering the standard deviation of cell expenditures and the ratio of the 90 th percentile to the 50 th percentile of cell expenditures. In general, they find little change in household risk over time except for some narrowly defined subgroups. Their approach is a valuable first step in quantifying the risk of incurring expenditures. However, it does not capture a number of other characteristics known to affect medical expenditures, including insurance and health status, does not consider the role of insurance in mediating or contributing to expenditures, and does not identify individual characteristics separate from family characteristics. Accounting for these characteristics may yield disparate results.
This paper adds to the literature by developing a prospective measure of medical care economic risk and considering risk in light of the health insurance decision using the 2014 Current Population Survey's Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC). We first present a theoretical framework illustrating the relationship between insurance, utilization, and expenditures decisions. We then model predicted expenditures based on a number of individual-and family-level characteristics. We estimate a novel measure of medical care economic risk as the proportion of families that do not have the resources to pay for their predicted expenditures at different points along the distribution of predicted expenditures by health insurance type. This approach incorporates transitions across health statuses and provides for examining more characteristics than is feasible with a cell-based approach, yielding potentially more precise estimates. In addition, because the analysis models expenditures at the individual level, it is possible to account separately for individual-level and family-level characteristics. We further use the estimates from our model to compare the extent to which different types of insurance mediate the risk of incurring non-premium expenditures by providing for increased utilization of medical care.
We find that while 21.3% of families lack the resources to pay for the median expenditures for their insurance type, 42.4% lack the resources to pay for the 99 th percentile of expenditures for their insurance type. We also find the mediating effect of insurance on non-premium expenditures to outweigh the associated premium expense for expenditures above $1804 for employer-sponsored insurance and $4337 for direct purchase insurance for those younger than age 65; and above $12 118 of expenditures for Medicare supplementary plans for those aged 65 or older.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To understand the considerations inherent in estimating a model of medical care economic risk, we outline a theoretical framework of the joint choices of how much insurance to purchase and how much medical services to utilize. We follow the approach outlined by Shen (2013) , but while Shen separately considers each of the insurance, utilization, and expenditures decisions, we consider the utilization and expenditures decisions jointly and instead emphasize the relevant budget constraints. For each decision, we also consider both insurance and utilization as continuous rather than binary outcomes. For simplicity, we consider only a one-period framework.
First, we assume that individuals who are eligible for means-tested public health insurance will take up public health insurance and will not purchase insurance. Accordingly, if an individual does not have positive resources available for medical care R, equal to income Y, less taxes T, less expenditures for basic needs N, we assume that he or she is eligible for and takes up public health insurance and does not purchase additional insurance I:
For an individual with positive resources available for medical care, the individual first chooses whether to purchase insurance, and if so, how much insurance to purchase. The individual chooses to purchase insurance I [0,1] at a given price per unit P I if the net value of insurance V I À ε I is greater than 0. The decision is based on individual characteristics X I subject the budget constraint given resources available for medical care, as follows:
where
Next, during the period, all individuals choose whether to utilize health care services, U ≥ 0, at the price P U , which have a value to the individual V U based on individual characteristics X U subject to the budget constraint given resources available for medical care less any premiums paid for insurance. Utilization is also dependent on insurance coverage to the extent that the price of utilization is mediated by insurance coverage such that P U = (1 À C) * P UT , where C [0,1] represents the extent of coverage of public or private insurance and P UT represents the full price of a unit of medical services before any insurance coverage. Accordingly, an individual chooses:
Given utilization and insurance coverage, the individual incurs some amount of health expenditures. The amount of utilization and the price of utilization give expenditures, which reflect both the individual's characteristics contributing to the insurance and utilization decisions as well as insurance coverage.
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
We model individual non-premium medical expenditures using a Poisson model with a random intercept at the family level separately for younger families (with members younger than age 65) and older families (with members aged 65 and older). Following Barcellos and Jacobson (2014) , we exclude premiums from this analysis because there is no uncertainty associated with them. Expenditures include such expenses as payments and co-payments for hospital visits, medical providers, dental service, prescription medications, vision aids, medical supplies, and over-the-counter health-related items. Let y ij denote the non-premium medical expenditure for individual i in family j, where i = 1,…, n j and j = 1,…, N. Similarly, let x ij denote a vector of observables (plus a constant) for individual i in family j, and x j denote a vector of observables for family j. Let u j denote the unobserved family-constant random effect for family j. We assume
This is the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) formulation of a varying-intercept hierarchical/multilevel model where level 1 is the individual and level 2 is the family. We find that this model naturally accounts for the overdispersion in the distribution of expenditures caused by a large amount of zeros by allowing correlation within a family via the hierarchical structure. For our analyses of medical care economic risk, we model expenditures at the individual level, but aggregate them to the family level, generally defined as the health insurance unit (HIU) as outlined by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center (SHADAC) (State Health Access Data Assistance Center, 2012). We control for individual-level characteristics (x ij ) including age group, race/ethnicity, sex, disability status, self-reported health status, relative self-reported health status within the family, metropolitan status, and veteran status as well as family-level characteristics (x j ) including family income-to-poverty ratio categories, 1 family size, highest family-level education, and whether there are infants, children aged 1-5, or children aged 6-18 present in the family. We do not control for health insurance type in the regressions because health insurance is jointly determined with medical expenditures. We use pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimation as presented in Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2006) to incorporate survey weights. More detail on the weighting procedure and a more thorough discussion on model fit are included in the Appendices. In all other analyses and tables, the data are weighted to be population-representative using Fay's replicate weights and corresponding replicate weighting methods.
The analysis sample consists of the 2014 CPS ASEC, a nationally representative survey of the civilian noninstitutionalized population living in the United States, covering the 2013 calendar year. There are several advantages to using the CPS ASEC including its timeliness and large sample size, and previous work has shown the comparability of the CPS ASEC medical expenditures data to the more detailed data collected by the MEPS (Caswell and O'Hara, 2010) . The analysis sample consists of 139 184 individuals corresponding to 73 597 families. Table I presents the mean, median, and 99 th percentile of expenditures for the full analysis sample and by family health insurance type and family income-to-poverty ratios for younger and older families. We see that the expenditures distribution is very skewed. For younger families, mean per capita expenditures are $680 while 50% of individuals have expenditures less than $200 and the top 1% have expenditures greater than $6800. For older families, mean per capita expenditures are $1220 while 50% of individuals have expenditures less than $550 and the top 1% have expenditures greater than $8500. We also see pronounced differences across health insurance types. For younger families, Medicare coverage is associated with the highest mean per capita expenditures, while Medicaid coverage is associated with the lowest. For older families, a combination of private and government coverage is associated with the highest mean per capita expenditures, while a mix of insurance and uninsurance is associated with the lowest. We see that expenditures generally increase with the income-to-poverty ratio and also see higher expenditures for older families than younger families across all income-to-poverty ratio groups.
RESULTS

Descriptive statistics
Model results
Table II presents select coefficient results of the Poisson random effects model estimated separately for younger families and older families for select characteristics.
2 In general, we see that women, individuals with disabilities, and those in worse health incur more medical expenditures. We also see that the effect of income on expenditures is U-shaped and that having younger children is associated with less expenditures by family members but having older children is associated with more.
A benefit of the model used in this analysis is the computation of family random effects in addition to coefficient estimates. The coefficients reflect the relationship between observable characteristics and medical expenditures. However, they do not capture factors not controlled for in the model, nor do they capture the risk of expenditures as represented by the distribution of expenditures. Using this analysis, this unobserved component is captured in the estimated family effect, which reflects the relative level of spending associated with each family. Examining these family effects by insurance type, which is not controlled for in the model, reveals very different dispersions of medical expenditures after controlling for the observable characteristics included in the model. Figures 1 and 2 present kernel density estimates of the distributions of the estimated family effects by select insurance types for younger families and older families, respectively. The family effects are added to the predictions from the coefficients and then exponentiated to obtain predicted expenditures. For younger families, Figure 1 compares the distribution of family effects for individuals covered by direct purchase plans, employer-sponsored plans, and Medicaid, as well as for the uninsured. We observe that direct purchase and employer-sponsored plans have similarly shaped distributions, although direct purchase coverage is associated with higher densities in the tails of the distribution as compared to employer-sponsored coverage. We also see that the distribution of family effects for the uninsured has a stark resemblance to those for Medicaid beneficiaries, both showing high densities of lower expenditures. For older families, Figure 2 shows the distributions for those with Medicare only and for those with combination of private and government coverage. The distributions are similar, but relative to those with a combination of coverage, those with only Medicare coverage have lower expenditures.
APPLICATION OF MODEL RESULTS
Estimating medical care economic risk
Having used our model to estimate coefficients and family effects determining medical expenditures, the first exercise of this analysis is to estimate the proportion of families who are at risk of incurring high out-of-pocket Figure 2 . Distribution of estimated family effects for older than age 65 by select insurance types Figure 1 . Distribution of estimated family effects for younger than age 65 by select insurance types RISKING LIFE AND LIMB: MEDICAL CARE ECONOMIC RISK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS medical care expenses in relation to their resources. To do this using our model, we first estimate baseline expenditures for each individual using the coefficients estimated by our model and then estimate a distribution of expenditures for each individual using the distribution of family effects associated with the insurance type of that individual's family using the health insurance categories presented in Table I . We sum the estimated expenditures across the individuals in each family at each of the median, 75 th , 90 th , 95 th , and 99 th percentiles of expenditures. We then compare the estimated family expenditures at each percentile to the family's resources available for medical care to identify the percent lacking resources to pay for the estimated expenditures at each percentile, measuring medical care economic risk. We define the family's resources available for medical care as family income, less federal and state taxes after all credits, less amounts paid for insurance premiums, and less spending on basic needs as defined by the Federal Poverty Guidelines.
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Because we believe our model-based estimates are more precise than cell-based estimates, we compare the risk results estimated using our model to those estimated using cell-based family expenditures percentiles. To do this, we replicate the general methodology used by Gruber and Levy (2009) characterizing cells based on family age group (younger than age 65, age 65 and older), family education group (highest family education of a high school diploma or less, highest family education of some college or more), whether there are children present in the family, and family size (one, two, or three or more people). Table III presents the results estimating medical care economic risk using our model and using the approach by Gruber and Levy (2009) . Using our model-based estimates, we find that while 21.3% of all families lack the resources to pay for the median expenditures for their insurance type, and 42.4% lack the resources to pay for the 99 th percentile of expenditures for their insurance type. This corresponds to 21.1% and 38.9%, respectively, for younger families and 21.9% and 61.3%, respectively, for older families. By definition, the percent lacking the resources to pay for predicted expenditures increases with higher percentiles of expenditures for both the model and cell-based estimates. We also see that the percent lacking the resources to pay for predicted expenditures for older families is consistently higher than for younger families. 4 As compared to the cell-based 3 We assign the appropriate guideline considering the health insurance unit as the family unit. 4 Cell-based estimates of risk using alternative cell criteria, such as health status and health insurance status, yielded similar results.
estimates using the Gruber and Levy (2009) approach, we see that the model estimates show higher percentages of families lacking the resources to pay for predicted expenditures for a given percentile of expenditures for both age groups at all percentiles except the 1 st percentile. While the Gruber and Levy (2009) approach captures the distribution of expenditures for each cell, our model estimates capture the distribution of expenditures by insurance type conditional on individual and family characteristics. Accordingly, the model-based approach may better reflect the actual distribution of expenditures because the model incorporates relevant observable characteristics.
Comparing expenditures and utilization by insurance type
In addition to estimating medical care economic risk, we use the results of our model to consider the relationship between insurance, the utilization of medical care, and predicted expenditures. To this end, we examine the extent to which insurance mediates predicted non-premium expenditures for families with different characteristics. We further examine how purchasing insurance by paying for premiums provides for additional utilization of medical care through lower predicted non-premium expenditures. Exploring these questions can provide insight into the value of insurance and the factors contributing to insurance and medical care utilization decisions.
To consider how insurance mediates predicted expenditures, we first look more closely at predicted median expenditures by select family types, age groups, insurance types, and health status. We consider a young family of four as representative for those younger than age 65 and an older family of two as representative for those aged 65 and older. 5 We also consider single-person families. 6 We focus on select insurance types: for those younger than age 65, these include direct purchase, employer-sponsored, Medicaid, and uninsurance; for those aged 65 and older, these include Medicare only and a combination of private and government coverage, 5 The younger family is comprised of a 26-to 34-year-old father, a 26-to 34-year-old mother, a 1-to 5-year-old male child, and a 1-to 5-year-old female child. The older family is comprised of a 67-to 74-year-old husband and a 67-to 74-year-old wife. 6 Comprised of a woman aged 26-34 years as representative for those younger than age 65 and comprised of a woman aged 67-74 years as representative for those age 65 and older. Predicted expenditures are lower for men in single-person families, but exhibit similar patterns to those for women, so are omitted here for the sake of brevity. We consider a young family of four as representative of a family plan for those younger than age 65. The younger family is comprised of a 26-to 34-year-old father, a 26-to 34-year-old mother, a 1-to 5-year-old male child, and a 1-to 5-year-old female child. We also consider a single-person family comprised of a woman aged 26-34 years as representative for those younger than age 65. 2 We consider an older family of two as representative for those aged 65 and older. The older family is comprised of a 67-to 74-year-old husband and a 67-to 74-year-old wife. We also consider a single-person family comprised of a woman aged 67-74 years as representative for those age 65 and older.
generally representing coverage by Medicare and a supplementary plan. We also focus on select health statuses: excellent health and good, fair, or poor health. We model all family members as having the same health status.
Comparisons of median predicted expenditures are presented in Table IV . Table IV shows that those in good, fair, or poor health have higher predicted expenditures than those in excellent health, across all family and insurance types. We also see that those with only public insurance have the lowest predicted expenditures for each age group, while those with private coverage have the highest predicted expenditures for each age group.
Next, we examine finer percentiles of family effects for select family, health insurance, and health status types in Table V . For brevity, for this and subsequent analyses, we focus on individual plans for each age group and insurance/health type because expenditures for families exhibit similar patterns. We see that the location of the family effect on its distribution accounts for large differences in estimated expenditures for a given set of characteristics, as compared to estimated expenditures for a similar individual in an average-spending family (i.e., with a family effect equal to the mean of zero). For example, for a 26-to 34-year-old woman in excellent health on a direct purchase plan, adding the 1 st percentile family effect decreases predicted expenditures by $392, adding the median family effect decreases predicted expenditures by $25, but adding the 99 th percentile family effect increases predicted expenditures by $9697. Likewise, for a 67-to 74-year-old woman in excellent health on Medicare, adding the 1 st percentile family effect decreases predicted expenditures by $534, adding the median family effect decreases predicted expenditures by $456, but adding the 99 th percentile family effect increases predicted expenditures by $2182.
In Table IV , we see that families with private insurance have higher predicted median non-premium expenditures than the uninsured, for younger families, and than those with Medicare only, for older families. These higher predicted non-premium expenditures come in addition to amounts paid for premiums. These higher predicted expenditures reflect that individuals expecting greater medical care needs and, in turn, expenditures, select into insurance and that the insured tend to overconsume medical care while the uninsured tend to underconsume it. As a result of these differences in utilization, comparing predicted non-premium expenditures by insurance type masks the mediating effect of insurance.
To better understand the mediating effect of insurance on predicted medical expenditures, we next examine predicted expenditures by health insurance type in light of utilization: in particular, the extent to which purchasing insurance lowers predicted non-premium expenditures and increases utilization of medical care. To this end, we first compare the median of total predicted expenditures, including non-premium and premium expenditures, to the value of medical care utilization for select family types, age groups, insurance types, and health statuses. To calculate total expenditures, we sum the median predicted non-premium expenditures presented in Table IV with the median premium associated with each plan type estimated from our data. 7, 8 We estimate the value of medical care utilization associated with the predicted non-premium expenditures using estimates by insurance type of the proportion of non-premium expenses for health services that are paid out-of-pocket (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2015) . From these estimates, we are able to derive a utilization-to-total expenditure ratio representing the dollars of services received per dollar of total expenditure by plan type incorporating the tradeoff between purchasing insurance for a premium but not necessarily utilizing the benefits associated with that insurance. Table VI presents the results, including median expenditures, premiums, and utilization-to-expenditure ratios. We see that, for a 26-to 34-year-old woman, regardless of health status, Medicaid gives the highest utilization per dollar of expenditure, reflecting low premiums and non-premium expenditures. In addition, for the same woman, regardless of health status, being uninsured is associated with higher utilization per dollar of expenditure than direct purchase or employer-sponsored coverage. For a 67-to 74-year-old woman, we see higher median utilization per dollar of expenditure associated with having Medicare only as compared to having Medicare and a supplementary plan regardless of health status. These results suggest that with median expenditures, opting out of purchasing private insurance yields a higher utilization per dollar of expenditures than purchasing private insurance.
However, these results still only compare median expenditures and do not capture the risk associated with the full distribution of utilization. To examine the full distribution of expenditures, Figures 3 and 4 plot the utilization-to-total-expenditure ratios along the distribution of expenditures by insurance type for a 26-to 34-year-old woman and a 67-to 74-year-old woman, respectively, each on an individual plan.
For both individuals, the mediating value of insurance increases at higher levels of expenditures. At lower levels of expenditures, the mediating value of insurance is low because any mediating effect of insurance on additional non-premium expenditures is outweighed by the premium expense. As expenditures increase, the mediating value of insurance increases because the mediating effect exceeds the sunk cost of the premium. The mediating value is determined by the premium and the proportion of expenses paid out-of-pocket by coverage type.
We are particularly interested in identifying the amount of expenditures beyond which the mediating effect of insurance exceeds the premium expense. Our theoretical framework suggests that conditional on available resources, an individual should choose insurance if the mediating value of that insurance exceeds the premium expense. This amount is represented by the intersection of the plotted values by insurance type and those for uninsurance in Figure 3 or Medicare only in Figure 4 . To identify this amount, we compare the median out-of-pocket premium amount for each insurance type to the decrease in non-premium expenditures the insurance provides. A younger individual with access to employersponsored coverage pays a median out-of-pocket premium amount of $1040, and one dollar of expenditure purchases 6.3 dollars (100/15.8) of utilization. Remaining uninsured has no premium expense, but each dollar of expenditure purchases only 2.7 dollars (100/37.3) of utilization. We find that the individual would incur less total expenditures by taking up the employer-sponsored coverage if he incurs $1804 in total expenditures, corresponding to $4837 or more in utilization. Likewise, a younger individual without access to employer-sponsored coverage pays a higher premium to obtain direct purchase coverage, an out-of-pocket median of $2500, and receives the same utilization per dollar of non-premium expenditure. This individual would incur less total expenditures by purchasing the direct purchase coverage if he incurs more than $4337 in total expenditures, corresponding to $11 628 in utilization. An older individual purchasing a supplemental plan in addition to Medicare coverage pays a median out-of-pocket premium of $2518 and each dollar of expenditure purchases 7.2 dollars (100/13.8) of utilization, compared to a median out-of-pocket premium of $1259 with each dollar of expenditure purchasing 6.4 dollars (100/15.4) of utilization without supplemental coverage. This individual would incur less total expenditures by purchasing the supplemental coverage if he incurs more than $12 118 in total expenditures, corresponding to $78 688 in utilization. Individuals who have expected expenditures below these amounts may still opt to purchase insurance. This reflects greater value to insurance beyond only its mediating effect on non-premium expenditures: for example, insurance also provides a consumption smoothing value by protecting against the uncertainty associated with the potential for incurring large or catastrophic future expenditures, among other benefits.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis estimated a prospective measure of medical care economic risk by considering the proportion of families who are at risk of incurring high non-premium out-of-pocket medical care expenses in relation to their resources and considered this risk in light of the health insurance decision. Our results lend themselves to exploring a number of policy implications. This analysis covers the period before the implementation of many provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, but as data become available to evaluate the effects of the ACA, we expect to see changes in the extent of and the characteristics associated with medical care economic risk. The ACA expands the population with health insurance coverage, resulting in fewer people uninsured, more covered by Medicaid, and more on direct purchase plans obtained through state and federal health insurance marketplaces. This increase in coverage may result in an increase in the use of preventative services, which may also increase the amount of medical expenses in the short run, but decrease the risk associated with these expenses by both limiting expenditures via insurance in the short run and through decreasing adverse health events in the longer term. Alternatively, increased use of medical services generally as a result of the reform may increase the amount of expenditures as well as the risk associated with them. Future work can use our framework to compare the shapes of the distributions of expenditures by insurance type. We expect to see changes in the shapes of those distributions as previously uninsured or underinsured individuals with differential spending patterns select into new insurance types. In addition, as the offerings of health insurance plans change, we expect to see changes in spending conditional on plan type.
There are several caveats to the interpretation of the results of this analysis. Both the medical care economic risk and utilization-to-expenditures analyses rely on coefficients and family random effects that are estimated by a model that may include controls that are to some extent interrelated. As a result, predictions may reflect correlation across individual characteristics as well as between individual-and family-level characteristics. This is of particular concern for those aged 65 and older for whom age, health status, and marital status may be particularly related and for whom family size is limited to one-person single households or two-person married households. In addition, because some insurance categories examined in the analysis reflect a very small sample size, the value of examining the distribution of the estimated family effects by these insurance categories may be limited and produce results that do not reflect the greater distribution of expenditures for that insurance category. However, this limitation should not present a challenge for examining the distributions for insurance categories with larger sample sizes.
Another limitation is that the analysis sample includes only the civilian non-institutionalized population, which does not represent the full U.S. population, and in particular, excludes groups with distinct medical care needs and resulting amounts of medical expenditures. These data exclude individuals living in group quarters, including such residences as nursing homes. Further, the survey methodology does not capture the full extent of expenditures for individuals in their last year of life who tend to have disproportionately large expenses.
The utilization-to-expenditures analysis also relies on constant proportions of expenses for health services that are paid out-of-pocket by insurance type, although this proportion is likely to vary over the distribution of expenditures. This analysis also relies on median premium estimates by health insurance type, and these may also vary according to the distribution of premiums. Despite these limitations, the analysis illustrates patterns of spending and utilization by insurance type and health status that shed light on the decision of whether and how much insurance coverage to purchase.
The results of this paper's analysis suggest several avenues for future work. Further analysis can more explicitly consider the relationship between changes over time in individual and family characteristics, such as health status, employment, and income, and medical expenditures using longitudinal data. While each year of the CPS ASEC consists of a cross-section of data, it is possible to link some respondents over two years. Accordingly, in future work, it is possible to examine how their medical expenditures changes over time and how their characteristics may have changed using the model presented in this paper as a model framework.
APPENDIX A: METHODS Weighting procedure Let w j be the reciprocal of the inclusion probability of family j and w i|j be the reciprocal of the inclusion probability of individual i given the sampling of family j. Following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2006) , we are interested in maximizing the following log likelihood logL β; γ; σ where λ ij = exp(x ′ ij β + x ′ j γ + u j ) and w Ã j and w i j Ã j are the associated mean-adjusted weights of w j and w i|j respectively, calculated as described in Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2006) and Pfeffermann et al., (1998) as scaling method 2. We implement the PML estimation using the NLMIXED procedure in SAS (Grilli and Pratesi, 2004) with (1) the default Quasi-Newton optimization algorithm and (2) non-adaptive Gaussian quadrature with 20 quadrature points to approximate the integral associated with the GLMM. We obtain empirical/sandwich estimators of the standard errors as model-based standard errors are not valid for PML estimation. Empirical Bayes estimates of the family random effects, requested via the PREDICT statement in NLMIXED, are used together with the estimates of the regression coefficients to obtain individual-level predicted expenditures.
Goodness of fit
While a standard goodness-of-fit measure for GLMMs is not obvious, density plots of actual and predicted expenditures in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 show remarkably similar distributions, and unreported results by insurance type, available from the authors by request, also show similar distributions for actual and predicted expenditures. A variety of other models were investigated, including a zero-inflated Poisson random effects model, but such models were found to offer little predictive gain over the simpler Poisson random effects model. In addition, simpler models such as Poisson and negative binomial models did not fit the data well because of the mass of zeros and skewed distribution. As seen in Appendix 4, a descriptive assessment of median predicted expenditures at all deciles of the observed value distribution shows a reasonably good fit to the data. While the random effects Poisson model does not predict any zero expenditures by nature of the model, the median predicted expenditures are small for low values of actual expenditures.
APPENDIX B: PLOTS OF ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION MODEL PREDICTIONS FOR YOUNGER
THAN AGE 65
